When people consider a series of random binary events, such as tossing an unbiased coin and recording the sequence of heads (H) and tails (T), they tend to erroneously rate sequences with less internal structure or order (such as HTTHT) as more probable than sequences containing more structure or order (such as HHHHH). This is traditionally explained as a local representativeness effect: Participants assume that the properties of long sequences of random outcomes-such as an equal proportion of heads and tails, and little internal structure--should also apply to short sequences. However, recent theoretical work has noted that the probability of a particular sequence of say, heads and tails of length n, occurring within a larger (> n) sequence of coin flips actually differs by sequence, so P(HHHHH) < P(HTTHT). In this alternative account, people apply rational norms based on limited experience. We test these accounts. Participants in Experiment 1 rated the likelihood of occurrence for all possible strings of 4, 5, and 6 observations in a sequence of coin flips. Judgments were better explained by representativeness in alternation rate, relative proportion of heads and tails, and sequence complexity, than by objective probabilities. Experiments 2 and 3 gave similar results using incentivized binary choice procedures. Overall the evidence suggests that participants are not sensitive to variation in objective probabilities of a sub-sequence occurring; they appear to use heuristics based on several distinct forms of representativeness.
Introduction
Many of the judgments that humans make are based on the abstraction of patterns in events that occur in the world. These patterns can take many forms, such as weather -deciding whether to take a coat or an umbrella based on the temperature and rainfall of previous daysthe behavior of other individuals -guessing when a co-author is likely to complete a manuscript draft based on their previous timeliness -or the behavior of wider groups of people -forecasting sales for upcoming months based on figures from recent months.
One of the challenges of any pattern-detection system, whether human or artificial, is to separate signal from noise: to extract, and base predictions on, systematic patterns that appear in the environment, and ignore observations that are-to the system at least-random. If distinguishing between regularity (which has predictive value) and randomness (which does not) is a basic requirement for making successful predictions about the environment, it is surprising that, in higher-level cognition at least, humans are relatively poor at recognizing randomness (for reviews see, Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Falk & Konold, 1997; Nickerson, 2002 Nickerson, , 2004 ; for a similar overview of randomness production, see Rapoport & Budescu, 1997) .
Most empirical research examining human (mis-) understanding of randomness has used equiprobable binary outcomes (see Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland, & Hastie, 2009 , for a review), such as the occurrence of red or black on a roulette wheel (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004) , or birth order of boys and girls in a particular family (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) . The most common scenario is the occurrence of heads and tails when repeatedly tossing a fair, unbiased coin (e.g., Caruso, Waytz, & Epley, 2010; Diener & Thompson, 1985; Kareev, 1992) . Across a variety of tasks-including choosing the most random of a set of sequences (e.g. Wagenaar, 1970) , classifying individual sequences as random or non-random (e.g., Lopes & Oden, 1987) , and prediction of future outcomes of a sequence of coin tosses or roulette wheel spins (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004 )-participants appear to mischaracterize the outputs of a random generating mechanism.
